These are organized by commonly asked questions involving the paper text. Section I discusses how school failure signals are distributed. Section II explains why residents look to school boards instead of other civil servants or elected officials when schools fail. Section III documents the electoral contexts which school board elections occur. Section IV compares geographic matching to assignment matching using a limited sample where school zone assignment maps are available electronically. Section V gives an illustrative example of how the running variable in the regression discontinuity models used in the paper was determined. Section VI outlines validity tests for the failure cutoff. Section VII discusses whether exit biases the estimates presented in the paper. Section VIII provides information about the first stage estimates the in regression discontinuity models. Section VIX discusses whether the results are robust to alternate model specifications, providing visuals of the effects shown in the paper. Section X provides an alternate visualization of the quantile regression discontinuity results presented in the paper.
I. Failure Signal Distribution
Administrators are required to publicize AYP failure to the surrounding community. NCLB states,
The state educational agency shall publish, and disseminate to parents and the public, information on any corrective action … through such means as the Internet, the media, and public agencies (Section 1116(c)(10)(E), ESEA). 1 In North Carolina, this requirement is fulfilled through two centralized channels: a state-run website and individual letters to those in the school-zone. Figure A.1 shows an example notification letter. The two centralized websites-www.accrpt.ncpublicschools.org and www.ncreportcards.org/src/-publish school failure status. Figure A. 2 provides examples of the information that is available on the first of these two.
The first panel shows the website interface; the second shows the format of information delivered for individual schools. Importantly, there is some evidence that these websites are widely used. As of July 2015, StatShow and SEMRush-two website traffic monitoring services-estimate that the first, broader site reaches roughly 100,000-140,000 unique visitors per month. The second site, which focuses solely on school report cards, but is more difficult to locate, generates visits from about 9,000-12,000 unique visitors per month. Additionally, there is some evidence that these sites receive the most traffic in the months after school performance is released. Still, the information on these websites is somewhat dense to navigate. This may contribute to why we see an effect among high propensity residents, but less so among low propensity. Consistent with this view, some have shown, in a lab setting, that making school performance data easier to interpret may increase the likelihood of a response (Jacobsen, Saultz, and Snyder 2012) .
Beyond these two centralized channels, decentralized channels may work to distribute school failure to the broader community. There is some evidence that the media plays a key role in distributing school performance signals-for example, Berry and Howell (2007) provide some evidence that local newspapers frequently cover the release of AYP status. Additionally, the home-buying market may also play an important role: with highly informed realtors distributing AYP status to those purchasing homes 1 Here, "corrective action" simply means failing to make AYP. in the area (Black 1999; Figlio and Lucas 2004) . These decentralized mechanisms likely combine with the centralized mechanisms to create the mobilizing effect described in the paper.
Figure A.1 Sample Adequate Yearly Progress Letter & Website Interface

II. Why School Boards?
Among citizens' options for exercising voice when schools fail, residents could play a part in influencing and/or choosing the local school governing bodies, such as the school board. School boards play an integral role in education reform. Their decisions are of critical import, forming the basis of education processes in classrooms and schools (Ehrensal and First 2008) . As such, school board elections play a fundamental roll in the education process. These elections tend to be close, further pushing individuals toward this venue for voicing their displeasure of school deterioration (for an example, see Green and Gerber 2008, 2-3) . Simply put, residents concerned with failing schools have powerful reason to focus their efforts on the local school board.
Further, the policy feedback literature has shown that the traceability of a policy to an elected official-or the ease of which an individual can connect a policy outcome to a policymaker-matters in whether their is a response by the mass public (Pierson 1993) . School boards are the most traceable elected officials when it comes to school outcomes, because they are the closest elected body to most parents.
There is some qualitative evidence that residents trace school failure to school boards. In a survey of parents, 78% indicated that school boards were extremely responsible when school performance deteriorated. 2 In the same survey, 88% of residents indicated that they believed that voting in school board elections would have an affect on school performance. 3 Finally, residents look to the school board for answers and solutions when their school fails. In another survey, citizens where asked to evaluate various solutions to school failure. Instead of blaming teachers and principals, residents looked to school boards most frequently for solutions. For example, providing more local comprehensive support from local officials outside the school received 54% of responses-almost 3 times as much as the next closest option. 4 2 Source: Accountability For All: What Voters Want From Education Candidates, Jan 2002. 3 Source: Accountability For All: What Voters Want From Education Candidates, Jan 2002. 4 Source: 2010 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll on What Americans Said About the Public Schools.
Taken together, these figures suggest that school board races are the right venue to look for a citizen response. For these reasons I restrict voting to elections in which a school board race was on the ballot. 5 This leaves me with a snapshot of the participation decisions made by the mass public in theoretically relevant elections. 5 I use "school board election" and "election with a school board race on the ballot" interchangeably. Given this mix of electoral contexts under which school board elections occur, schools were matched to the next election in which a school board race would be on the ballot. The elections used are documented below. 2006 2005-2006 7/21/2006 11/7/2006 2006-2007 7/21/2007 11/6/2007 2006-2007 7/21/2008 5/6/2008 2007-2008 7/21/2008 11/4/2008 2008-2009 7/21/2009 11/3/2009 2008-2009 7/21/2009 5/4/2010 2009-2010 7/21/2010 11/2/2010 2010-2011 7/21/2011 11/8/2011 2010-2011 7/21/2011 5/8/2012 Note: AYP status is matched to the next election with a school-board race. In North Carolina, school board elections are held at different times across school districts, but consistently within the same district. Thus, school performance for a given year is matched to only one election.
III. What Elections are used?
IV. Does Geographic Matching Bias the Results?
School and voter data are collected at different levels. The unit of observation in the voter file is the individual, and the unit of observation in the accountability data is the school. In order to fit the two data sources together, I matched registered citizens to the school that the minimized Euclidean distance between the registered voter and a public school. 6 The matching process identified the closest elementary, middle, and high schools, along with the most proximate school among the three. Individual citizens could be matched to any public school that reported NCLB school performance. 7 This matching process was relatively efficient, with 96.4% of citizens in the voter file being matched to the school closest to their address. There was no difference in match rates across passing and failing schools. The geographic matching procedure does relatively well at matching citizens to their assigned schools. And when it does not, no observables predict mismatch (see supplemental information).
The advantage to this matching approach is that it links school performance with validated voter behavior, something not done previously. Previous work has focused on matching school performance to survey responses, focusing on self-reports of school attendance and evaluation rather than actual behavior (Chingos, Henderson, and West 2012; Jacobsen, Saultz, and Snyder 2012). My strategy gives us a rich picture of the effect of school performance and citizen voice. The disadvantage of this matching approach is that some matches are more accurate than others. Though this approach comes with this disadvantage it is likely of minimal concern, outweighed by the benefit of matching schools to verified voting behavior.
In North Carolina, geographic matching does reasonably well at assigning registered citizens to assigned schools. Carolina school zones and only in one year (2010); hence, I cannot use it to match all, or even a significant portion of citizens to schools. 9 Still, it can be used as an informative check of alignment between geographic and actual school-citizen matching for the subsample of schools for which both methods are available. The panels in Table 2 report alignment between assignment and geographic matching.
In each of the four panels, the first two lines report the percent of citizens placed in an assigned school and district by the geographic matching procedure. Overall, geographic matching puts citizens in one of their assigned schools around 60% of the time, with registered voters in assigned districts 90% of the time. Moreover, these estimates are likely biased downward as the available SABINS data comes primarily from the urban districts in North Carolina. Sparser, more rural districts have fewer boundaries, thus match rates are likely understating the effectiveness of the geographic matching.
The next five lines in Table A .2 compare registered voters that are matched to their assigned schools to registered voters that are not matched to an assigned school. Citizens where geographic matching aligns with assignment matching have similar voting status, race, party, gender, and age to those not in assigned schools. In short, when geographic and assignment matching are not consistent there are not observable voter traits that predict this distinction. As such, it appears that errors in matches are just adding noise to the estimates presented in the paper.
To confirm this assertion, I compare whether registered voters were matched to an assigned school at equal rates on either side of the school failure cutoff. To verify this, I reran the regression discontinuity models on a 0-1 variable for whether the geographic match aligned with an assignment match. If matching biased my results, we would expect to see a discontinuity in this variable at the failure cutoff. We do not. The results revealed that the closest (p=0.19), elementary (p=0.74), middle (p=0.38), and high school (p=0.32) geographic matches produced the same proportion of aligned matches on either side of the failure cutoff. Thus, the geographic matching procedure I employ in the paper is highly unlikely to bias the results presented. 28 Notes: Geographic matching, though imperfect, does reasonably well at matching citizens to an assigned school. This table compares geographic to assignment matching of registered voters to schools. Geographic matching pairs citizens to their closest school (among all schools, elementary, middle, and high); while, assignment matching pairs citizens with the schools districts assign. Assignment matching is determined using the School and Boundary Information System (SABINS) housed at the University of Minnesota, which is only available for a handful of North Carolina districts and only in 2010. The panels report alignment between assignment and geographic matching when SABINS data is available. In each of the four panels, the first two lines report the % of geographically matched citizens in an assigned school and district. The next five lines compare registered voters in aligned schools vs. not. Alignment between the two matching methods is not predicted by observed registered voter traits. Table A .3 shows the inputs of treatment and the running variable. It shows an example of a single school.
V. How is the Running Variable Specified?
For this school, there are multiple subgroup scores repeated (up to 10 in each subject). For each subgroup, a determination is made based on whether the score is above or below the cutoff (marked by a horizontal line in each subgroup box).
As mentioned in the paper, this process follows the procedure of Ahn and Vigdor (2014a) and is meant to mirror the legal framework of NCLB. This approach is used because it bests others in its ability to correctly identify failure with the running variable, with ~80% of schools identified correctly.
Misidentification comes from ambiguities in the proximity provisions.
Schools must be over the threshold in all subgroups to pass. School 1 fails to make AYP because of its performance among subgroups 7 and 10. To identify the running variable, I choose one subgroup per school. In the example listed above, Subgroup 10's level score would identify the running variable. The intuition behind this choice is that in order to pass the school would have to raise Subgroup 7 and Subgroup 10 scores above the cutoff. Yet, as Subgroup 10 is further below the cutoff than Subgroup 7, this channel would have to be brought up the most in order for the school to pass. Thus, this gives a more accurate representation of how far a school is away from making AYP.
VI. Does the Discontinuity Satisfy Specification Checks?
If the assumptions of the RDD design hold, the estimate for Failing School (β1) will be unbiased by confounders or simultaneity because schools fail as-good-as randomly within a narrow bandwidth (Lee 2008; Lemieux and Milligan 2008) . Thus, the interpretations of coefficient estimates are similar to that in a randomized-control experiment. Determining whether the assumptions of RD hold, then, is of upmost importance. In this section I provide evidence for the validity of the failure to make AYP discontinuity.
The discontinuity at the failure cutoff could produce biased estimates if some other treatment shared the same cutoff as AYP. This is unlikely. To the author's knowledge, no previous research identifies NCLB's specific cutoffs as being substantively meaningful. The threshold for individual schools is sufficiently precise so as to allay any concern that the threshold itself had any substantive meaning. For example, elementary schools in 2010-11 had cutoffs of 71.6% (reading) and 88.6% (math) students proficient in the overall subgroup in order to pass AYP. These specific numbers have little meaning independent of their distinction as the pass/fail level. By all appearances they are arbitrarily set.
Similarly, bias could be introduced if jumps were found at points near the cutoff. However, these are not found in my data. This is confirmed by placebo tests for jumps at points other than the discontinuity.
Additionally, if schools could precisely manipulate their proximity to failure score my results could be biased. Some have levied this criticism, for example, against the commonly used close-race discontinuities used to estimate electoral effects (Caughey and Sekhon 2011) . 10 In the No Child Left
Behind example, precise manipulation sufficient to threaten the validity of a discontinuity requires more than just a handful of schools being able to manipulate their scores. This type of behavior would have to be rampant, occurring differentially across relevant school characteristics (Lee and Lemieux 2009).
In order to check for precise sorting, methodologists argue that researchers "should begin by considering theoretical reasons for the violation of the RD assumption." In the NCLB example, precise sorting is theoretically unlikely for a couple of reasons. First, NCLB's usage of multiple subgroup categories makes it a difficult task for a large population of schools to manipulate their score. Doing so for one, let alone 20 subgroup categories is no easy feat. As such, precise sorting is not as straightforward in this regression discontinuity application. Second, if precise manipulation were to occur, a theoretical argument could be made that schools with higher resources would have the leg-up in the ability to do so.
If this were the case, a disproportionate amount of high-resource schools at baseline would find themselves in the control group: able to ensure that they marginally pass AYP. Given the long empirical research showing that resources increase turnout across a variety of contexts, this would if anything provide conservative estimates of positive treatment effects. Put another way, if precise sorting occurred, effects that showed an increase in turnout in response to school failure would likely be biased downward by the artificially high number of high resource schools that make their way into the control group.
Additionally, if precise sorting occurred we would likely see it in empirical checks of covariate balance at the cutoff. In order to check for precise sorting-and other potential threats to a discontinuity-methodologists recommend two best practices. First, Eggers et al. recommend that researchers implement, "a battery of balance tests on pretreatment covariates and lagged values of the outcome variable, using the same specifications as the analysis on the outcome variable" (2015, 273) .
This test is similar to the covariate balance tests used in randomized control trials. If observable traits are relatively balanced at the cutoff, we can reasonably infer that the cutoff is arbitrary and that there is minimal precise manipulation of proximity to failure (Lee and Lemieux 2009). Second, methodologists also recommend the implementation of the McCrary Density test (2008)-a test that looks for clusters of schools centered on the preferred side of the treatment cutoff. The rationale here, applied to the NCLB example, is that if schools are precisely manipulating the failure cutoff, we might expect to see a cluster of schools that are just barely passing. I implement and discuss both of these checks here. Both test support the validity of the school failure cutoff as sorting schools in an as-good-as random manner near the failure cutoff. Table A .4 looks for imbalances among potentially influential covariates at the failure cutoff. This approach uses the same specification used to explore for treatment effects, reporting the coefficients and p-values from these models.
VIa. Covariate Balance
Of note in Table A .4 is that several potentially important confounders are balanced at the discontinuity. Important to the analysis at hand, all of the lagged dependent variables (in the first panel) are balanced at the cutoff. Substantively, this means that in the year before schools fail, they tend to have on average similar levels of voter turnout and exit. If precise sorting that biases the relationship between failure and our outcomes were to occur, we would likely see imbalances in these variables. We do not. In essence, this is a strongly informative placebo test for the validity of the discontinuity used (Eggers et al. 2015) . That this discontinuity passes this test is very powerful evidence of the validity of the school failure discontinuity for the examination of these outcomes. (2015) explore whether there are imbalances in a larger set of school characteristics. They find that 23 out of the 26 variables (90%) examined are balanced at the failure cutoff.
Finally, it might be tempting to argue that other post-treatment differences may be driving the effect observed in the paper. In particular, if school failure led to changes in schools, then these may be behind the voice and exit effects shown in the paper. Simply put, people might be reacting to these downstream changes instead of the school failure signal, per-se. In this situation we would be measuring the indirect instead of the direct effect of the failure signal.
It is important to note that such a situation could explain why citizens respond to school failure signals-because failure sets in motion downstream consequences that residents don't like, and thus react to. As such, any indirect effects that failure elicits would still be meaningful: being a part of why NCLB elicits voice or exit responses. These would, however, change the interpretation of the effects list in the paper from being attributable to a failure signal to attributable to failure-induced changes. While it is impossible to account for all post-treatment differences-an inherent difficulty in standard approaches used to look for indirect effects (Imai et al. 2011 ; Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010)-I consider a few here.
If a school were to lose (or gain) money because it failed, citizens could be responding to these changes in funding rather than directly to the failure signal. This situation is unlikely given the provisions underlying NCLB and the timing of funding decisions. NCLB does not mandate any changes to funding rates if a school fails. These are generally set well in advance of school performance. By the time school failure status is determined in a given year-at the end of July-schools already have their funding levels in place for the start of the next school year, which starts only a couple of weeks later. I show this in Similarly, it may be tempting to argue that the number of or attributes of school staff (i.e. teachers and principals) might influence voice and exit decisions. If failure moves these school attributes, residents may be react to these rather than the direct failure signal, per-se. However, it appears that these attributes are also locked in for the upcoming school year by the time failure status is determined. This is shown by the fact that teacher and principal post-treatment differences are all small and not statistically significant across failure status. In short, failure status is determined so close to the subsequent school year that teacher and principal characteristics are likely not driving the voice and exit effects observed.
In short, given the timing of the release of failure signals so close to the upcoming school yearas little as 2 weeks prior to the start of the school year-schools have little power to change many of their institutional features that residents might react to. As a result, residents are likely responding to the failure signal and not the downstream failure-induced changes. These post-treatment outcomes provide evidence that resource levels do not change before the elections held or documented exits occur. Hence, the effects documented in the paper are in response to school information signals and not changes in resources. Even after the elections occur and the exits in a given year are documented, most of the post treatment differences remain balanced. In the year after the effect is observed, Log Per-Pupil Expend (p=0.73), Based on this evidence it seems that school failure sorts schools into marginally passing and marginally failing categories in an as-good-as random manner. This discontinuity shows little evidence of shared treatment or precise manipulation of student performance. The specification tests outlined above support the use of the school failure cutoff as sorting schools in an as good as random fashion. Thus, we can likely use failure status as a test of citizens' responsiveness to the performance based accountability signals.
VIb. McCrary Density
To support the validity of the failure discontinuity, I also But what explains this break at the cutoff? In all likelihood, it has to do with the exemptions granted to individual schools under NCLB. As discussed in the text, some schools are brought above the failure cutoff based on growth or "confidence interval" exemptions. Others have noted that these exemptions are likely behind the distribution of schools around the failure cutoff, rather than schools' ability to precisely manipulate the running variable (Traczynski and Fruehwirth 2014; Holbein and Ladd 2015) . They show this by documenting that the cluster of schools just above the failure cutoff disappears when the confidence interval and growth exemptions are left out of the running variable calculation. I replicate this finding in Figure A. 3 below by recalculating the running variable without these exemptions.
True enough, the cluster of just passing schools disappears under this specification of the running variable. This suggests that the distribution of schools around the cutoff is driven by policy-driven exemptions rather than the precise manipulation of schools. This, reinforced with the other theoretical reasons and empirical checks, offers powerful evidence that the failure cutoff is sorting schools in an asgood-as random manner.
Still, to be abundantly cautious against the possibility of some other underlying trait driving precise manipulation, I include the school fixed effect mentioned in the text in the regression discontinuity models. This should absorb schools "propensity to manipulate" the treatment as long as this ability remains constant over time. This combined with covariate balance at the cutoff offer reassurance to the marginal failure of this informal specification test. 
VII. Are the Turnout Effects Confounded by Exit?
The estimates in the paper indicate that failing schools increase voter turnout in elections involving a school board race. However, when individuals receive a signal that their school has failed, some choose to vote with their feet rather than voting at the ballot box. This behavior could drive or confound my results.
Indeed, a decline in the denominator might be behind the rise in overall turnout.
Two factors determine the nature of this bias: first, the extent to which exit occurs and second, the attributes of those who leave. If we can identify the type of individuals who exit when a school fails, we can sign the bias introduced to the relationship between school failure and voter turnout. I examine these two factors here.
First, the models from the paper indicate that when schools fail, citizens react by voting with their feet. However net movements are not substantively large, unlikely to produce increases in turnout alone (by decreasing the denominator of voter turnout). A decrease on the order estimated in the paper-though it has implications for local schools-is not large enough to produce the substantive increases documented in the paper. Second, though net movements are small, movement of certain types of citizens may play a large role, introducing bias into the failure-turnout relationship estimated in the paper. Table   A .5 demonstrates the nature of the bias depending on the type of individuals who move. If high propensity voters (high income, education, etc.) move to passing school zones when their school fails, my estimates would be biased downward. More high propensity voters in the control group (passing schools) would inflate their turnout numbers in subsequent elections, thus narrowing the effect size of failure on turnout. This type of outcome is documented in cell [2]. 
VIII. What About the First Stage Estimates?
As the models employ fuzzy regression discontinuity, it is reasonable to wonder about the first stage estimates. Simply put, is the instrument produced by the running variable strong enough? Or, put differently, is the running variable producing a sufficiently large jump in the probability of failure at the failure cutoff? To address this, I produce graphs showing the first stage estimates, shown in figure A.4 below. Each of these show that the running variable used produces a strong instrument. for the closest school match, regardless of school level; 0.70 for the closest elementary school; 0.71 for the closest middle school; and 0.83 for the closest high school. All of these estimates are highly significant, easily clearing the 1% significance threshold. These estimates are also substantively large, with each of these easily clearing the recommended thresholds for instrument strength provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) . These conclusions all hold with parametric specifications of the running variable. 13
They also hold for the district-level estimates-with this collapsed discontinuity producing a discrete jump in the number of failing schools that is sufficiently large and statistically meaningful.
Figure A.4 First Stage Estimates
Closest School Elementary School
Middle School High School
VIX. Are the Results Robust to Alternative RD Specifications?
The results shown in the paper are robust to the bandwidth selection (to a point, given the finite number of schools narrow bandwidths are low power given a finite number of schools) and alternative specifications of the running variable. Table A .6 shows specifications based on various model specifications. These show consistent positive turnout estimates, with a few instances where statistical precision is not possible at traditional levels. However, substantively, the estimates remain in the same ball-park across estimates. As we would expect, the estimates in the wider bandwidths are more precise. These benefit from having enough weighted school-year observations to precisely estimate the coefficients. Moreover, the estimates do not vary by bandwidth-wider bandwidths are statistically and substantively to those in the narrower bandwidths. Of all the four school estimates, the substantive size of the elementary school estimate varies the most across bandwidths. Still, these estimates are not statistically distinct across the bandwidths. Also, in some of the narrower bandwidths we do not have enough power precisely estimate the effect of failure signals on turnout. Still, it is assuring that the estimates are in the same neighborhood across the bandwidths, even when weighted school-year observations are less abundant. The lack of data may especially be behind the lack of significance when we look at the effect of high school failure.
Compared to the other two school types, high schools are fewer in number and as such their estimates have less precision. As shown in the paper, high school estimates benefit from the inclusion of a school fixed effect.
Figure A.6: Failure's Effect on Turnout by Bandwidth
Notes: Check across different bandwidths using non-parametric regression. Unit of analysis is the school-year, weighted by the number of students in the school. Table A .7 shows alternate parameterizations that show failure signals' affect on exit. Like the turnout estimates, these are remarkably similar across various model specifications. Figure A .8 shows the robustness of this result across bandwidths. In general, we are able to be much more precise with the exit estimates, with these are showing that failure increases exit. 
Figure A.7: Failure's Effect on Exit by Bandwidth
Notes: Check across different bandwidths using non-parametric regression. Unit of analysis is the school-year, weighted by the number of students in the school. The graph orients itself with the Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth, which in the four models is approximately 0.4. The corresponding table on the right shows the number of school-year observations in the estimation sample. 
X. Quantile Regression Results
The results from the quantile regressions shown in the paper (Figures 2 and 3) are simplifications of the quantile models run, included for ease in interpreting this method that may be unfamiliar to many in political science. The figures in the paper do not account for uncertainty. As such, figure A.8 shows the results from these quantile regression models with the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates.
If school failure mobilized all groups equivalently the coefficients would be relatively similar across deciles. In practice, this is not what we observe. When schools fail, high propensity residents respond more than low propensity. Across all school types the effect size increases as we go up the turnout distribution. For example, when we consider elementary school failure, we see that exposure to treatment raises turnout in the top quantile by 13% (compared to marginally passing schools) while only moving turnout in the bottom quantile about a third as much, increasing turnout by only 5%. These differences are substantively meaningful-the upper coefficient is about 2.6 times the size of the lowerand statistically distinct. This pattern follows in the closest school match and with middle schools, but only slightly when high schools fail.
Figure A.8: Performance Information & Turnout Inequality
Note: Results from quantile regression discontinuity models. Figure plots the effect of failure across the various turnout quantile levels. Unit of analysis is the school-year. Coefficients are based on models with a quartic polynomial of the running variable and the full bandwidth. Standard errors are bootstrapped. High Schools
